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I. Introduction
Aid surges o¤er both challenges and opportunities to recipient countries. Some argue that these surges may hurt growth by inducing real exchange rate appreciation pressures, to the detriment of growth-promoting exporting industries; 1 while others believe they may spur growth by …nancing muchneeded public investment in infrastructure. 2 Concerns about the potential negative e¤ects of aid surges may trigger policy responses aimed at dampening these e¤ects. For instance, Berg et al. (2007) documents how, during aid surges, concerns about real appreciation induced several African economies to accumulate much of the additional aidrelated foreign currency in reserves. This response may have helped contain the appreciation pressures. But when combined with a …scal policy that entailed the full spending of the local currency counterpart to the aid, this response turned out to be problematic. It led to an increase in the money supply, and di¤erent sterilization policies posed new challenges to these economies: those that did not sterilize faced high in ‡ation; whereas those that did sterilize experienced high interest rates.
These di¤ering views and concerns about aid surges have created the need for a common framework to analyze the short and medium term macroeconomic e¤ects of aid surges, as well as the appropriate policy responses. This paper proposes such a framework, by developing a dynamic quantitative model that can be useful for Fund sta¤ teams and policy-makers in recipient countries. The model has already been used to help formulate country-speci…c aid scaling up scenarios. As part of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Africa Steering and Working Groups, the IMF was requested to provide macroeconomic assessments of "Gleneagles aid scaling-up scenarios" for several African countries. IMF (2008a) and IMF (2008b) present the …rst six country scenarios, …ve of which used the model presented here. 3 The novelty of our model stems from its structure, which captures the main mechanisms and policy issues of interest in low-income countries (LICs). The model features a learning-by-doing mechanism (LBD) that creates an externality associated with the production of traded goods and captures the notion that real exchange rate appreciation may harm productivity growth in the traded sector; a role for public capital in production, so that government spending can raise output directly and potentially crowd in private investment; and less-than-full conversion of public investment into useful public capital. 4 The model also allows for separate and possibly uncoordinated …scal spending and reserve accumulation responses to aid surges, permitting a variety of policy combinations. By assumption, the …scal 1 See Rajan and Subramanian (2010) , among others. 2 See, for instance, Collier (2006) . 3 IMF and UNDP (2010) describes the full joint project. The assessments have been developed for Benin, Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tanzania, and Zambia. The model used for Niger is described in Farah et al. (2009) . 4 The model also features hand-to-mouth consumers to capture …nancial market imperfections that can give …scal policy larger real e¤ects in the short run; limited access to international capital markets that gives sterilized intervention an important role; and imperfect mobility of productive factors across traded and non-traded sectors, which a¤ects the degree of real exchange rate appreciation.
authority eventually spends all the incremental aid; the question here is about the e¤ects of doing so as the aid comes in, which we de…ne as full spending of aid. The monetary authority, on the other hand, in ‡uences aid absorption, which we de…ne as the use of the foreign currency proceeds from aid to …nance higher current account de…cits (net of aid). It does so by accumulating part of the aid ‡ows in international reserves.
In previous work we have shown, using a smaller model without private or public investment, that policies that are frequently implemented in response to aid ‡ows can have striking implications for the short-run behavior of macro variables such as the real exchange and the real interest rate. 5 Here, we demonstrate that the same policy responses can sometime have adverse medium-term e¤ects as well, depending on the e¢ ciency of public investment and the extent of learning by doing externalities in the economy.
We show these results by calibrating our model to the Ugandan economy and running several experiments. To …x ideas, we start with a baseline scenario of a ‡exible exchange rate regime, somewhat e¢ cient public investment, mild LBD externalities, and …scal and reserve accumulation rules that imply the full spending and absorption of aid. As the government spends the aid, demand pressures emerge. These combine with nominal price rigidities in the non-traded sector to create a short-lived spike in real gross domestic product (GDP). The real exchange rate substantially appreciates and the traded sector su¤ers a contraction but recovers in the medium term. Over time, price rigidities dissipate and the demand impulse fades out, but GDP continues to grow on the strength of higher public capital and the resulting higher private capital accumulation.
The substantial short-term real appreciation pressures of the baseline scenario may concern policymakers who are committed to maintaining competitiveness in the traded sector. We therefore investigate the consequences of partial absorption policies that may help counteract these pressures: (i) accumulating some of the aid ‡ows in reserves in the context of a (managed) ‡oat, and (ii) operating a …xed exchange rate regime.
Accumulating reserves succeeds in mitigating appreciation pressures but crowds out private consumption and investment in the short run, thus lowering real GDP over the medium term relative to the full-absorption baseline. The underlying cause of the crowding out is the attempt to use the same aid resources twice: the central bank uses aid in ‡ows to build up reserves, while the …scal authority uses the domestic currency counterpart of these in ‡ows to increase spending. Aid resources can be used either by the government for increased spending or by the central bank for reserve buildup, but not for both without crowding out the private sector.
A …xed exchange rate regime may also stem appreciation pressures, depending on the associated monetary policy. This regime induces the authorities to accumulate reserves in resisting nominal appreciation. If the authorities do not sterilize the associated monetary emission, the resulting in ‡ation induces a real appreciation and produces roughly a full-absorption scenario that closely resembles the baseline in real terms. E¤orts to resist the in ‡ation by sterilizing the monetary emission will again succeed in narrow terms but at a cost of partial aid absorption, higher real rates, and private sector crowding out. 6 As before, this implies lower real GDP in the medium term.
Why might governments nonetheless consider partial absorption policies? Maybe because, in contrast to our baseline assumptions, the e¢ ciency of public investment is low, while very strong LBD externalities imply a signi…cant loss in productivity of the traded sector when output in this sector contracts. In this context, accumulating some additional aid in reserves may relieve some of the short-term appreciations pressures without inducing adverse medium-term e¤ects on real GDP. To fully understand this result, it is necessary to investigate the roles of the e¢ ciency of public investment and the LBD externalities-and their interaction-in the model.
Consider the role of e¢ ciency, i.e., the extent to which public investment is actually converted into useful capital. In our model, there is a distinction between the e¢ ciency of steady-state investment and that of the investment …nanced by the scaling-up of aid. What matters for the e¤ects of aid on real GDP (in percent changes) is the e¢ ciency of the aid-surge investment spending relative to steady-state e¢ ciency. Our focus in this paper is on this "relative e¢ ciency" concept. In our model, countries that are less e¢ cient in this sense enjoy lower medium-term bene…ts in real GDP terms, as less public capital is accumulated and the crowding in e¤ect on private investment is smaller.
Strong LBD externalities, on the other hand, raise the stakes: they may amplify positive e¤ects of aid on traded output and real GDP-which we refer to as "Dutch vigor"-but the may also make aid harmful -causing "Dutch Disease." Whether the strong externalities amplify the positive or negative e¤ects of aid depends on the e¢ ciency of public investment, as this will determine if the shrinkage in the traded sector is temporary or protracted.
When e¢ ciency is low and externalities are strong, Dutch-disease type e¤ects can dominate-under full absorption policies-so that aid reduces real GDP. By limiting the contraction in traded sector output, partial absorption policies can help mitigate these e¤ects, even if they still crowd out private investment in the short run.
In these circumstances, however, there are better ways to respond to aid surges, while mitigating appreciation pressures, than partial absorption policies. First, if government spending is ine¢ cient and there are strong externalities, then the reserve accumulation policy could be accompanied by partial spending of aid. Second, if aid were to be used more e¢ ciently, then the GDP e¤ect of scaled-up aid would always be positive, and more so with full absorption. 7 We support these …ndings with some simple welfare analysis. With low e¢ ciency and strong externalities, accumulating some of the additional aid in ‡ows in reserves may generate small welfare gains if aid is fully spent, although partial spending is preferable. However, with high e¢ ciency, this result is overturned, as there are large gains from fully spending and absorbing the aid. 6 The model features limited international capital mobility making sterilization policies e¤ective in a small-openeconomy set-up, even when the exchange rate is …xed.
7 Spending more aid on investment rather than consumption or allocating more public investment towards the traded goods sector are policies that are not explored in this paper but that would-like achieving higher e¢ ciency-yield better growth outcomes than partial absorption in the face of strong LBD externalities.
Our work distinguishes itself from the literature by simultaneously analyzing both short-term (demand) and the medium-term (supply) e¤ects, in a context where …scal and central bank policies shape the spending and absorption of aid and matter for medium-term outcomes. Adam et al. (2009) , our previous work Berg et al. (2010) , Bu¢ e et al. (2008) , and Prati and Tressel (2006) , among others, also focus on the e¤ects of various policy responses to aid in ‡ows, but they do so in models where sectoral output is exogenous or capital accumulation is absent. The absence of capital accumulation is a notable simpli…cation, given that all the way from the work of Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1939) to that of Kydland and Prescott (1982) , macroeconomic theories have underscored investment dynamics as an important channel for the transmission of aggregate shocks. By introducing both public and private capital, our work shows that investment spending plays a key role in shaping the e¤ects of monetary and …scal policies under aid surges.
Our work also di¤ers from papers that present real models with capital, including Adam and Bevan (2006) , Agenor et al. (2008) , Agenor and Yilmaz (2008) , Arellano et al. (2009 ), Cerra et al. (2008 , and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) , among others. Despite their important contribution, they do not model …scal and monetary policies and, therefore, do not permit a rich discussion of the interaction of these policies and their implications for the short-to-long run e¤ects of aid. In addition, these works have not underscored the role of the e¢ ciency of public investment, as our work does. 8 These investment ine¢ ciencies may have important implications for the empirical calculations of capital as well as for growth analysis. 9 Finally, our partial absorption results are reminiscent of those in Calvo et al. (1995) , which are derived in a small stylized model: absent international capital mobility, preventing the real exchange rate from appreciating leads to some combination of temporary higher in ‡ation and higher domestic real interest rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the structure of the model. Section III discusses the calibration to Uganda. Section IV presents and elaborates on the results of the experiments, starting by the baseline scenario. A discussion of the scope of our results, including some welfare analysis, is presented in section V. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. The Model
Consider an in…nite-horizon small open economy. The economy has two goods, a traded good (T ) and a non-traded good (N ), and consists of the following agents: i) two types of households, some participating in asset markets and others not; ii) two sectors with …rms producing traded and nontraded goods using labor, private capital, and public capital; iii) a central bank in charge of exchange rate policy and monetary policy, including reserve accumulation policy; and iv) a …scal authority that is the direct recipient of aid and decides how much of this aid to spend as part of its …scal policy.
There is exogenous deterministic growth of the labor-augmenting type, which is the same across sectors. The labor productivity level T t grows at the constant factor n so that T t = nT t 1 . To facilitate the description of the model, we will present its structure in stationary terms. 10 This involves rescaling variables by T t when required, such that all the variables are constant in the long run (steady state).
We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded good. Therefore P T t = S t P T t ; where P T t is the price of traded goods, S t corresponds to the nominal exchange rate, and P T t is the foreign price of traded goods. By denoting the domestic (foreign) Consumer Price Index (CPI) as P t (P t ), we can express the CPI-based real exchange rate as s t =
StP t
Pt and the relative price of non-traded goods as
We also de…ne real gross domestic product (GDP) as:
i.e., the sum of the production of the non-traded good, y N t , and the traded good, y T t , valued at their steady-state relative prices p N and s. Next, we describe the objectives and constraints of the di¤erent agents of this economy.
A. Households
There is a continuum of households on the interval [0; 1]. A fraction p is represented by households who are forward-looking and smooth consumption by being able to trade in asset markets. These are asset holders or savers and will be indexed by the superscript "a". The rest of the households 1 p have no assets and cannot smooth consumption. They will be indexed by the superscript "h" and behave in a "hand-to-mouth" fashion, fully consuming their current labor income. 11
A.1. Asset Holders
Savers must decide how to allocate consumption expenditures among di¤erent goods. Consumption of the traded good and the non-traded good, denoted by c aT t and c aN t , respectively, are combined into a CES basket
with the associated CPI
; where denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, and ' is the degree of home bias in consumption. This CES aggregator implies the following demand functions for traded and non-traded goods: c aN these varieties. The demand for variety i is given by:
where
The representative saver maximizes his life-time utility: 12
with
where c a t C a t Tt refers to a consumption basket of the type described in (2),
PtTt are the holdings of real money balances, and l a t is the amount of labor supplied to …rms for the production of the non-traded and traded goods. The parameter a 2 (0; 1) corresponds to the subjective discount factor of the asset holders, # a 2 (0; 1) is the share of consumption in the utility u a (:); > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between c a t and m a t , { a is a scale parameter, and > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
We want to capture the notion that labor mobility is limited across sectors and that intersectoral wage di¤erentials are possible. Supplied labor is then de…ned as in Bouakez et al. (2009) :
where 2 (0; 1) is the share of labor supplied to the non-traded sector, l aN t , in total employment, and % > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between labor services provided to the two sectors. The index of real wages associated with the aggregator (6) corresponds to:
The budget constraint of the representative agent, de ‡ated by the domestic CPI and expressed in stationary terms, is given by:
PtTt is the saver's real holdings of domestic bonds issued by the government, which pay a "gross"nominal interest rate i t 1 + r t and b a t B a t P t Tt denotes his real holdings of foreign assets that pay a "gross" nominal international interest rate i t and are subject to portfolio adjustment costs P a t . PtTt denoting the real wage in sector k = N; T . Moreover, t = Pt P t 1 denotes "gross"domestic in ‡ation, while is foreign in ‡ation; which is assumed to be constant; a t denotes real pro…ts from domestic …rms; is an income tax rate set by the government; rm are remittances received from abroad and assumed to be constant; and a is a transfer from asset holders to hand-to-mouth consumers. 13 This budget constraint implies that spending (left-hand side) must equal income (right-hand side).
The portfolio adjustment costs are given by P a t 2 (b a t b a ) 2 ; where b a is the steady-state value of the real foreign assets. These costs serve two purposes. First, they ensure stationarity of b a t . 14 Second, they allow us to model di¤erent degrees of international capital mobility. When ! +1; the capital account is practically closed; whereas when 0 < << 1; it is partially open.
The problem of the asset holders reduces to maximizing (4) with respect to consumption, real money balances, labor supply in both sectors, and domestic and foreign assets, subject to the constraint (8) and a transversality condition associated with all asset holdings. The …rst-order conditions of this problem are presented in the Appendix.
A.2. Hand-to-Mouth Consumers
Households that do not have access to asset markets rely on labor income, remittances, and transfers as their only source of income. The representative agent from this group maximizes utility as in (4) and (5), where c h t and l h t take the same form as in (2) and (6). The agent is subject to a transversality condition associated with money holdings and the budget constraint: 15
with w t l h t = w N t l hN t + w T t l hT t and h = p 1 p a . Note that in principle hand-to-mouth consumers could smooth consumption by changing their money holdings. To prevent this, we can assume that their subjective discount factor h is set to zero. In this regard, their problem becomes static. The …rst-order conditions of this problem are listed in the Appendix.
B. Non-Traded Good Sector
This sector faces monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities. Each monopolist produces a variety i of the non-traded good. The technology of the representative producer i is given by:
1 3 This transfer simpli…es the analysis of the model by avoiding the need to keep track of the di¤erent consumers. They ensure that consumption at the steady state is the same for the two types of households. See Galí et al. (2007) . 1 4 See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for alternative methods to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets. 1 5 The share of consumption in the utility for these consumers, # h ; can be di¤erent from that of asset holders. In this way we ensure that real money balances are the same across both types of households, at the steady state, given that the demand functions are not the same for both types, as shown in the …rst-order conditions stated in the Appendix.
where z N is a constant productivity parameter; l N it is the amount of labor employed, k N it 1 is private capital, which is …rm-speci…c, and q t 1 is public capital. The coe¢ cient N indicates the production share of labor, while N denotes the share of private capital in total capital used in production. Private capital is subject to a depreciation rate N : It is accumulated via investment x N it , which is a composite of traded and non-traded goods like in (2), and subject to adjustment costs
as in Christiano et al. (2005) . Then:
The monopolist is subject to a demand constraint of the Dixit-Stiglitz type described in (3)
where y N t is the overall demand for the non-traded good. She also faces price adjustment costs
where N t is the non-traded goods in ‡ation with the steady-state value represented by N . These costs are a variant of those proposed by Rotemberg (1982) , as they allow for indexation to past values of in ‡ation.
The maximization problem of the monopolist corresponds to choosing the price level p N it , the amount of labor, capital, and investment in order to maximize the discounted pro…ts
subject to equations (10)- (12), where G t corresponds to G it with p N it = p N t . 16 The …rst-order conditions are presented in the Appendix.
There is a tax distortion $ that reduces the value of …rms'sales net of price adjustment costs for any given level of production. This distortion is o¤set in the aggregate, as the amount $(p N t y N t G t ) is restituted to each …rm, but it a¤ects …rms'incentive to hire labor and invest in new capital. It is meant to capture a broad set of institutional features that keep poor countries from investing at the high rates that might otherwise be justi…ed by the very low stocks of private capital. In this way, we match the observed low investment shares in many low-income countries. In addition, each …rm receives a subsidy N per unit produced and net of price adjustment costs, which is …nanced with a tax common to the entire sector. This simpli…es the steady-state analysis by ensuring that distortions arising from monopolistic competition are zero at steady state.
C. Traded Good Sector
The traded sector features perfect competition and ‡exible prices. The representative …rm j is endowed with a similar technology to that of the non-traded sector:
The representative …rm also accumulates capital k T it through investment x T it which is subject to
Accumulation is dictated by
The …rm picks the amount of capital, labor and investment in order to maximize the discounted pro…ts
subject to equations (13) and (14). As in the non-traded sector, sales in this sector are also subject to the tax rate $: The Appendix lists the …rst order conditions.
One of the chief concerns with a scaling up of aid is the possibility of Dutch disease e¤ects. Frequently, the real appreciation and shrinkage of the traded sector are interpreted as evidence of these e¤ects. However both e¤ects may not constitute a "disease", as they are an indispensable part of the transmission mechanism to shift resources from the traded to the non-traded sector in order to meet higher government demand for non-traded goods. Rather, to capture the idea of a "disease", we introduce learning-by-doing (LBD) e¤ects into the traded sector: a decline in the traded sector will impose an economic cost through lost total-factor productivity (TFP) in this sector. 17 More formally, we assume that the productivity in the traded sector depends on the history of the deviations of the previous sectoral outputs from the steady state, as can be inferred from
where z T is the steady-state value of the productivity in the traded sector, and z 2 (0; 1) and v > 0: This speci…cation is a variation of the one in Matsuyama (1992) and Krugman (1987) . 18 It implies that there are no permanent e¤ects of learning by doing on output or productivity. But deviations of traded sector output from trend do imply persistent productivity e¤ects.
D. The Government
Governments face potentially good opportunities for public investment but have limited access to external capital and …nd raising taxes very costly. 19 The government is the direct recipient of foreign aid A t ; which follows the process
where A is the steady state level of aid, A t corresponds to an exogenous increase in aid at time t, and A 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that measures the degree of persistence of the increase in aid.
Government consumption g t is a CES basket that includes traded and non-traded goods and is de…ned by
which implies the following government price index p
; expressed in terms of the CPI. In this speci…cation, is the degree of home bias in government consumption, which may di¤er from its private counterpart. Using the aggregator (17), we can derive the following demand functions:
and g
The government can …nance its spending p g t g t through a variety of sources: taxes on labor income w t l t , using the domestic currency value of aid proceeds, s t A t , drawing down on deposits held at the
. This domestic debt (b t ) is held by households that can save (b c t ) and by the central bank (b cb t ). The government also pays interest on the share of government debt that is held by consumers,
. Then we can write the period-by-period government budget constraint as
Government spending g t , which is endogenously determined by the constraint (19), can be used for public consumption or investment purposes. 20 We distinguish between the public investment that is a constant share of steady-state government spending, i.e., x gs t = s g with s 2 [0; 1]; and the public investment associated with the increase in aid, i.e., x gA t = A (g t g) with A 2 [0; 1]: These investments serve to accumulate public capital q t following
1 9 On revenue-raising capacities in low-income countries, see Heller et al. (2006) . 2 0 We do not model agency and asymmetric information problems between donors and recipients that may determine aid composition as in Cordella and Dell'Ariccia (2007) . Neither do we consider the implications of aid for institutional development, except indirectly insofar as this is related to the size of the traded goods sector. On these issues, see e.g. Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2007) .
where g is the depreciation rate of public capital, and " s ; " A 2 [0; 1] measure the e¢ ciencies of the two types of public investment.
These e¢ ciency parameters " s and " A capture the idea that less than one dollar of public capital is created for each public dollar spent on investment. The traditional "perpetual inventory method" infers the stock of public capital from information on public investment, and assumptions about depreciation rates, using equation (20), with the critical implicit assumption that " s = 1 and " A = 1. However, this assumption is fraught, particularly in developing economies. Whether because of waste and corruption, an absence of market pressures to ensure that all projects have the highest possible rate of return, or simply misclassi…cation of current spending (e.g. salary payments to civil servants) as investment, a dollar of public investment spending may not always yields a full dollar of public capital, as argued by Pritchett (2000) . 21 The …scal policy question of interest here is how fast to spend the local currency counterpart to aid in ‡ows. We assume that aid dollars accrue to the …scal authority, which then sells them to the central bank in return for a domestic currency deposit. The accumulation of government deposits is described by the following rule, which depends on the increase in aid:
where A and d g are the steady-state levels of aid and deposits, and d 2 (0; 1). In this setup, the government will always spend the steady state amount of aid. However, an increase in aid A t may or may not be spent initially, depending on the policy parameter 2 [0; 1]. If aid is not spent, it will initially accumulate as deposits but will be gradually spent over time. Both d and determine the speed of spending. To close the …scal policy side of the model, we assume that domestic government debt is constant: b t = b:
E. The Central Bank
In a typical aid-dependent country, the canonical aid-related monetary policy problem can be described as follows: when the government spends the local-currency counterpart to aid in ‡ows, how should the resulting monetary emission be handled? In particular, how much should be sterilized? And should the sterilization be done through the sale of local-currency open-market operations or through the sale of foreign exchange?
To study this problem, we introduce in the model the central bank balance sheet A di¤erent approach to model ine¢ ciency considers that governments can be viewed as producers of (public) goods. Governments that produce more of a particular good while spending less on inputs can be viewed as more e¢ cient than governments that produce less output and use more inputs. As an application of this approach to estimate the e¢ ciency of government expenditure on education and health in Africa, see Gupta and Verhoeven (2001 
:
The central bank implements the following rule for the foreign currency value of reserves:
where S t is the nominal depreciation of the currency, and R and S are the steady-state levels of reserves and nominal depreciation. The persistence parameter R satis…es R 2 (0; 1), while ! s 0 measures the degree of commitment to a nominal depreciation target.
This rule implies that the accumulation of reserves is driven by three separate factors. First, the central bank always sells the steady-state value of aid, but may react di¤erently to changes in the volume of aid. The coe¢ cient ! measures the fraction of additional aid dollars sold on the market by the central bank, i.e., the degree of immediate absorption outside of the steady state. Second, the central bank may also follow a …xed exchange rate regime by setting ! s very high. 22 Finally, while the amount of reserves may deviate persistently from its long-run value, we assume that the central bank targets a particular long-run value of reserves, provided that ! s is not in…nite, which may be calibrated to a country's historical average or to some desired level of reserves.
Regarding the monetary policy rule, we assume that open-market operations adjust so that reserve money always grows at the rate g t . This captures the fact that many low-income countries still target money, at least de jure. Note that at the steady state, reserve money grows at the rate g, and otherwise its growth rate is adjusted in response to in ‡ation. More speci…cally, open-market operations imply the following process for b cb t :
Therefore in the event that aid is spent but not absorbed, open-market operations would increase in order to fully sterilize the direct monetary injection that would follow from incremental aid in ‡ows. Note that because the previously introduced portfolio adjustment costs P a t are a function of private sector net foreign assets, central bank sterilized interventions will in general matter in this set-up, as we will see below.
F. Aggregation and the Goods Market Equilibrium Conditions
We aggregate across both types of households, so a t = pa aHere we only state the goods-market equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium in the non-traded goods market is described by:
while the market-clearing condition for traded goods can be derived by combining the equilibrium condition (25) and the budget constraints for all agents, including both types of consumers, the government, and the central bank:
where x T T t and x N T t correspond to the traded components of the investments in the traded and nontraded sectors, respectively. Equation (26) also summarizes the possible uses of aid: it can …nance a higher current account de…cit net of aid (CAD), a capital account surplus (KAS), or an accumulation of reserves (RA).
III. Calibration
Our analysis will rely on calibrated numerical simulations. 23 Because the model is micro-founded, some parameters can be based on microeconomic evidence, such as the e¢ ciency of investment. Other parameters depend on steady-state ratios that can be determined from national income accounts, public and private sector balance sheets and input-output matrices, or can be informed by moreor-less structural macroeconometric estimates, e.g. money demand parameters. Other parameters describe the policy response to aid or the policy regime in place and can therefore be treated as free parameters that are modi…ed according to the policy experiment. Some parameters will remain poorly determined, whether because data are unavailable or because the model's simpli…cations imply that an exact empirical counterpart may not exist. For these parameters calibration is based partly on standard values found in the macro literature, and partly on desirable properties for the dynamics of the model following the increase in aid-such as smooth hump-shaped responses. For this reason and, more generally, as a check on the overall calibration, system properties of the model, such as on the e¤ects of aid or public investment on growth, are also compared to reduced form macroeconometric or case-study evidence.
We calibrate most of the parameters of the model to the Ugandan economy. Since there are a large number of parameters, we organize the discussion around three groups: preferences, technology, and policy. Tables 1-3 summarize the calibration or policy reactions we will study below. We now brie ‡y discuss the calibration of some of the parameters that are crucial for the policy experiments.
The preference parameters are presented in Table 1 . Regarding the value for 1 p; the 2009 Steadman Survey …nds that 62 percent of Ugandans do not have access to formal or informal …nancial services. The interaction of such large share of hand-to-mouth consumers with the money targeting rule results in large spikes in the real interest rate in the baseline scenario that do not seem plausible. As a result, a lower share was chosen. With respect to the parameter %; which measures the elasticity of substitution between hours worked in the two sectors, there are no empirical estimates for developing economies. We set it to 1, which corresponds to the econometric estimates provided by Horvath (2000) . As for technology parameters presented in Table 2 , we have relied on recent developing economy estimates by Arslanalp et al. (2010) on the impact of public capital on growth. These estimates approximately imply that (1 j ) j = 0:1 for j = N; T: 24
In the experiments below we assume that the economy has a closed capital account, which makes sterilization policies more e¤ective. Consequently, we choose a very high value for .
The parameters of the learning-by-doing externality, v and z ; are in line with …rm-level paneldata estimates of the learning-by-exporting literature in developing economies. Mengistae and Pattillo (2004) …nd that the growth rate of total-factor productivity of export-oriented manufacturing …rms in Sub-Saharan countries depends on lagged total factor productivity. Their estimates roughly correspond to z = 0:1: Calibrating v is more challenging, as most of the learning-by-exporting literature estimate representations in which the current productivity of the …rm depends on the dichotomous variable of lagged export status, which captures whether the …rm exported or not in the previous period. 25 By adopting this approach, most of the works implicitly assume that there is also an asymmetry in the e¤ect of lagged export status on productivity. Isgut and Fernandes (2007) , however, take an alternative approach and report estimates of learning-by-exporting e¤ects for Colombian manufacturing …rms 2 4 The literature on the link between public investment (capital) and growth seems to be reaching a consensus that the link is positive, but not as big as originally estimated by works such as Aschauer (1989) .
2 5 See for instance Van Biesebroeck (2005) , among others.
using the lagged ratio of exports to output. Following their estimates, we set v = 0:1: We model a temporary but persistent increase in aid such that, as a result of the scaling up, aid is on average six percentage points of GDP higher than its steady-state value over the following …ve years. Note that the coe¢ cient A in the process for aid described in (16) results in a half life of the shock of slightly more than a year, which implies the aid increase is front loaded.
Finally the value of the steady-state e¢ ciency " s is based on work by Aresto¤ and Hurlin (2006) . 26 For our baseline calibration we assume " s = 0:4. This assumption, along with the parameters that govern the steady-state investment rate, the depreciation rate, and the parameters of the production function, implies that the marginal product of public capital in the steady state is 13 percent. One might also calculate the marginal product of public investment at the steady state, which corresponds to the increase in output due to an additional dollar of public investment. With our baseline calibration, this equals 13" s or 5:2 percent.
2 6 Aresto¤ and Hurlin (2006) take a close look at the relationship between dollars spent on certain speci…c categories of public investment and physical capital indicators and were able to infer some public investment e¢ ciency measures, in our sense, for Colombia and Mexico. They …nd that the relationship between public investment and the change in the capital stock is indeed linear, as assumed in equation (20), and that "s has a value of about 0.40 for these two countries. Interestingly, they …nd a value of about 1.0 for the United States. Pritchett (2000) calculates, using a very di¤erent methodology, that "s equals about 0.5 in many low-income countries, with substantial heterogeneity across countries. The impact of aid-surge-related public investment on the percentage deviations of real GDP from its steady state is determined by the relative e¢ ciency " A "s ; and this what we generally mean by "e¢ ciency" in this paper. The reason is simple. Consider a change in the calibration that increases both e¢ ciencies by the same amount. In this case, the given aid surge yields the same percentage GDP deviations, because there are two opposite e¤ects. The good news is that the aid surge will build more public capital, because " A is higher. The bad news is that the higher value of " s means that the steady-state capital stock must be larger, as implied by equation (20) . But the percentage change in output is proportional to the percentage change in the capital stock. Thus, a larger capital stock implies a smaller percentage increase in capital and hence output for the same dollar increment to aid. As shown in the appendix, these two e¤ects exactly o¤set for the Cobb-Douglas production technologies of our model. 27 For the baseline, we assume " A = " s . Of course, it could go either way. For example, rapid scaling up might put pressure on administrative procedures and "absorptive capacity" and reduce e¢ ciency " A relative to its steady-state counterpart " s . On the other hand, a more careful preparation of public investment programs, and more generally better public-sector management and institutions, would tend to lead to higher e¢ ciency " A . Overall, it must be stressed that the value of the e¢ ciency parameter " A is surely country and context-speci…c.
IV. The Experiments A. The Baseline Scenario
For the baseline scenario, we use the parametrization in Tables 1-3 . In this scenario, aid-related public investment is as e¢ cient as in steady state (" A = " s ) and there are mild learning-by-doing externalities ( z = 0:1 and v = 0:1). Moreover, the exchange rate regime is ‡exible (! s = 0), and the government deposits and reserve rules imply full spending ( = 1) and full absorption (! = 1) of aid. We also assume that open-market operations adjust so that money always grows at the rate g t .
The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 1 , where the annual impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables are measured as percentage deviations from steady state. The shortrun macroeconomic e¤ect of the aid surge is driven by its impact on government spending, in particular on non-traded goods. Because of nominal price rigidities, the supply of non-traded goods expands in response to greater demand, generating a short-lived spike in real GDP. This expansion in non-traded output is mostly accomplished through increased labor demand, which is partly satis…ed by drawing labor from the traded sector. A higher demand for labor from the non-traded sector contributes to the rapid increase in real wages in the short run, which translates into higher non-traded goods in ‡ation. This, however, does not induce higher CPI in ‡ation, because the nominal appreciation causes traded goods de ‡ation. The combination of higher wages and nominal appreciation adversely a¤ects pro…tability in the traded sector leading to a decline of its output in the short term. 28 Over time, as nominal rigidities dissipate, the demand-driven boom fades. However, part of the government spending has been used to increase public investment. The public capital stock increases, causing a persistent and positive e¤ect on GDP that accounts for most of the output increase in the medium term. This process is reinforced by the expansion of private capital stocks in both sectors, following an increase in the marginal value of capital, re ‡ecting the positive e¤ect of more public must fall if both e¢ ciencies are raised, in order to match observed output with the higher public capital stock. The bad news referred to above can thus be understood as being related to the fact that the marginal product of capital-which depends on total factor productivity-must be lower. Along the same lines, the marginal product of public investment is invariant to "s; changes in "s a¤ect the marginal product of capital in inverse proportion. This point is made by Pritchett (2000) in a di¤erent context. 2 8 Note that the nominal interest rate also increases. Using the money demand equations from the savers and nonasset holders and the monetary rule, it is possible to show that the nominal interest rate is an increasing function of consumption and in ‡ation. As consumption rises, then the nominal interest rate also goes up. capital on the marginal productivity of private capital. 29 The overall e¤ects of aid on output do not appear strikingly large. With our 6 percent-of-GDP aid surge extending over some 5 years, output is some 2.6 percent higher than steady state at its maximum (6 years after the beginning of the aid surge). To provide some context, our baseline marginal product of capital of 13 percent may be compared to estimates of rates of return on World Bank projects of roughly 20 percent. 30 However, other evidence suggests our growth impacts may not be too far o¤. We can also de…ne the macro rate of return of public investment as the internal rate of return implied by the stream of additional output less additional aid-…nanced investment. This return is close to 17 percent in the baseline calibration, re ‡ecting all the frictions and features of the model. This result is broadly consistent with aggregate evidence in Arslanalp et al. (2010) about the growth e¤ects of public investment and Clemens et al. (2004) about the growth e¤ects of high-impact aid. Of course, an increase in public investment e¢ ciency relative to steady state, more aid allocated to investment, more responsive factor markets, and lower adjustment costs to private investment and other changes in the calibration would yield larger medium-term growth e¤ects, and sensitivity exercises along these lines may be worthwhile in particular cases.
The real exchange rate appreciation plays numerous roles in the transmission mechanism. First, by making traded goods relatively cheaper, the real appreciation shifts private sector demand from non-traded to traded goods. This frees domestic capacity to meet the higher government demand for non-traded goods. Second, by increasing imports and lowering traded output, the real appreciation contributes to an increase in the trade de…cit. This implies that for a given output, domestic consumption and investment can expand. This is clearly facilitated by the central bank's reserve policy of fully absorbing the aid. As we will discuss below, without such a reserves policy, higher government spending related to the aid surge would imply that private sector consumption and/or investment would have to decline, meaning higher government spending would crowd out the private sector.
B. Partial Aid Absorption Policies

B.1. Reserve Accumulation Rules under a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
Policy makers are likely to be most worried about the loss of competitiveness due to the real exchange rate appreciation resulting from the aid surge. The central bank may therefore decide to limit the amount of foreign exchange sales to the market, using the aid in ‡ows instead to build up 2 9 The marginal value of capital is calculated as a weighted average of the implied marginal Tobin Qs for each productive sector.
3 0 One might consider that the World Bank rates of return should be compared to the lower marginal product of investment in our model. On the other hand, World Bank projects may be relatively e¢ cient, particularly the small fraction (well below half in recent years) for which ex post rates of return are calculated (Warner, 2010) . For example, very few projects report a negative net rate of return, even when other indications exist that returns may be negative, and ex post returns are calculated for very few projects whose execution is deemed highly unsatisfactory. More generally, there are a number of reasons to think that these estimated project returns are substantially overstated. foreign exchange reserves and, in this way, contain some of the appreciation. 31 Berg et al. (2007) …nd that this is exactly what many sub-Saharan central banks did during aid surges. As some governments were also trying to spend most of the aid, then accumulating aid ‡ows in reserves created an excess of liquidity and, consequently, in ‡ation pressures. Some central banks then decided to implement bond sterilization policies to counteract these pressures.
We simulate the model to study the macroeconomic implications of accumulating some of the increased aid ‡ows in reserves (a partial absorption policy with ! = 0:5), while the government implements a deposit rule that implies full spending of aid. We compare this with the full-absorption policy of the baseline (! = 1). We also assume full sterilization through domestic open-market operations of the resulting monetary emission. The simulations are shown in Figure 2 .
Limiting the sale of aid-related foreign exchange is indeed e¤ective in reducing the appreciation, both in nominal and real terms. As a result, the trade de…cit widens by less, which implies only a partial absorption of aid in ‡ows. Given full aid spending, partial absorption at an economy-wide level must imply a reduction in private sector demand. This implies a signi…cant private sector consumption and investment crowding out, which takes place in the …rst three to …ve years. Moreover, the reduction in private investment has a signi…cant adverse impact on real GDP, roughly halving the positive GDP e¤ect of scaled-up aid over the …ve-to-ten-year horizon. Hence, limiting foreign exchange sales in order to stem the nominal appreciation comes at a signi…cant cost. 32 The underlying cause of the private sector crowding out is the authorities'attempt to use the same aid resources twice: on the one hand, the central bank uses the foreign exchange value of aid in ‡ows to build up reserves; on the other hand, the government uses the domestic currency counterpart to increase spending. Whereas government spending of aid resources would normally correspond to an externally-…nanced increase in spending, the central bank use of the foreign exchange counterpart for building up its foreign reserves e¤ectively transforms this into domestically-…nanced spending. Externally-and domestically-…nanced government spending have very di¤erent impacts on the private sector. In an externally-…nanced case, the foreign exchange in ‡ows are used for …nancing a larger current account de…cit. This allows government spending to increase without crowding out private sector demand. In the case where the foreign counterpart of aid in ‡ows is used for reserve buildup, the current account de…cit does not increase. Consequently, higher government spending necessitates a lower private sector demand, unless there is a very large supply response.
B.2. A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime with Sterilization
Many aid recipients have …xed exchange rate regimes or may consider pegging as a way to avoid nominal appreciations associated with aid surges. Therefore, we proceed to study the implications of implementing a …xed exchange rate regime (! s = 10000) in comparison to the ‡exible regime of the baseline scenario (! s = 0).
For the simulations we consider both full sterilization bond policies, as in the baseline, and no sterilization. To shut down sterilization, we replace the sterilization rule (24) by a rule in which central bank purchases of nominal government bonds grow at the rate g t ; implying the following process:
At steady state, this process ensures that nominal money supply grows at the gross rate g, which pins down the steady-state level of in ‡ation. Outside of the steady state, however, this rule does not ensure a constant growth rate for nominal money, as the growth rate will be a¤ected by whether aid is spent but not absorbed. Speci…cally, equation (22) shows that the combination of declining government deposits (spending aid) and increased accumulation of reserves (not fully absorbing aid) may lead to a faster nominal money growth rate than g The real exchange rate appreciation is similar to that under a ‡exible regime, but because traded goods prices remain constant, non-traded in ‡ation has to increase signi…cantly more to bring about the same relative price change. This also means substantially higher overall in ‡ation, because unlike the ‡exible regime case, there is no traded de ‡ation. Without traded de ‡ation, there are larger demand pressures in the non-traded sector, as re ‡ected by a more pronounced short-run spike in GDP, relative to the one in the ‡exible regime scenario. Over the medium term, however, output responses are almost identical to the baseline.
With a …xed regime, the accumulation of international reserves is not a policy choice but is governed by the need to sell as much foreign exchange as needed to keep the nominal exchange rate constant. In contrast to the baseline scenario, where aid in ‡ows were sold to bring about a nominal currency appreciation, under the …xed regime part of these in ‡ows are accumulated as reserves. Absent sterilization, and provided the domestic currency counterpart is fully spent by the government, this reserve accumulation leads to a large increase in the money supply. 33 This money supply expansion is instrumental in accommodating the overall increase in in ‡ation, which in turn brings about the real appreciation necessary for close-to-full absorption of the aid in ‡ows. In fact, the dynamics of private investment is broadly the same across regimes. The real short interest rate increases to help keep in ‡ation expectations anchored, but this increase is moderate and short-lived, despite the accommodative monetary policy stance.
The central bank could prevent the money supply expansion through open market operations that sterilize the domestic currency counterpart of the foreign reserve accumulation. 34 In this case, the monetary policy stance would become much tighter, with real interest rates increasing by much more and remaining high for a longer period, as shown in Figure 4 . This would lead to signi…cant private-sector crowding out. The associated reduction in private sector import demand would limit economy-wide absorption, including private investment, as well as the real exchange rate appreciation. But once more, lower private investment would reduce the medium-term impact of aid on real GDP. These e¤ects are very similar to those of the partial absorption scenario under the ‡exible exchange rate regime, and the corresponding policy considerations apply here as well.
C. Learning-by-Doing Externalities, The E¢ ciency of Public Investment, and Partial Absorption Policies
In this section we explore the interactions of the learning-by-doing (LBD) externalities, the ef…ciency of public investment, and partial absorption policies. We proceed in three steps. First, we discuss the implications of varying e¢ ciency in our model. Second, we explore the consequences of increasing the LBD externalities and its interaction with low e¢ ciency of public investment. And third, we examine the e¤ects of partial absorption policies in the context of strong externalities and low e¢ ciency.
C.1. The E¢ ciency of Public Investment
A signi…cant change in the (relative) e¢ ciency with which public investments translate into public capital may have a large impact on GDP. Figure 5 illustrates this by keeping the e¢ ciency of the general public investment process at 40 percent (" s = 0:4), and comparing three scenarios: (i) a low-e¢ ciency scenario where the e¢ ciency of aid-surge-…nanced investment is reduced to 10 percent (" A = 0:1); (ii) the baseline scenario (" A = 0:4); and (iii) a high-e¢ ciency scenario, re ‡ecting 100 percent e¢ ciency (" A = 1).
The di¤erence in the GDP e¤ect between the high-and low-e¢ ciency scenarios is sizeable. In the high-e¢ ciency scenario, the GDP e¤ects are large and persistent, owing to public capital accumulation and the associated crowding in e¤ect on private investment: the larger public capital accumulation raises the marginal value of private capital, which triggers an increase in private investment. In contrast, the low-e¢ ciency scenario is characterized by a large but short-lived demand-driven boom and practically no GDP e¤ects beyond the short term. 35 
C.2. The Learning-by-Doing (LBD) Externalities
The term "Dutch disease"in this paper is reserved to describe the potential negative e¤ects of the smaller traded-goods sector on productivity, here modeled through powerful LBD externalities. But these externalities cut both ways: increases of traded output relative to its trend can also generate productivity gains in this sector and, therefore, amplify the positive e¤ects of aid, especially over longer horizons. We will call this "Dutch vigor."
The LBD externalities are governed by the parameters v and z of the speci…cation in (15), which measure the strength and persistence of traded output changes on its TFP deviations from trend. To understand the role of these externalities, we compare the model dynamics under strong externalities (v = 0:5 and z = 0:5) with the baseline scenario (v = 0:1 and z = 0:1). Figure 6 shows this comparison, with the line marked with dots representing the strong externalities scenario. Relative to the baseline, strong externalities have the expected e¤ect of amplifying the decline in the traded sector, which leads to a fall in GDP in the short-term and a lower economy-wide GDP e¤ect over the …rst eight years. Moreover, the real exchange rate appreciation is less pronounced, re ‡ecting a reverse Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect due to the decline in productivity in the traded sector relative to that of the non-traded sector. The non-traded sector, in contrast, is broadly una¤ected by varying the LBD externalities.
Looking beyond the …rst eight years, however, shows a stronger economic performance under the strong LBD externalities-the Dutch vigor. The key here is that higher public capital accumulation induces crowding in e¤ects on private capital accumulation, as captured by the expansion of private investment in Figure 6 . This eventually helps raise traded output above its steady state level. Once output exceeds the steady state, the externalities boost traded sector TFP, which ampli…es the positive medium-term e¤ect of public and private capital accumulation on this sector and the whole economy. Moreover, as predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, the increase in the traded sector TFP causes and appreciation of the real exchange rate relative to the baseline scenario.
LBD externalities raise the stakes. They can amplify positive e¤ects of aid, but they may also make aid harmful in terms of real GDP e¤ects. The key determinant of whether they amplify or undermine aid's positive e¤ects is the relative e¢ ciency of public investment. The use of aid matters, because this will determine whether a shrinkage in the traded sector is temporary or protracted and thereby whether the externalities have positive or negative e¤ects. The line marked with circles in Figure 6 illustrates this point, by representing the combination of strong LBD externalities with low e¢ ciency of public investment (" A = 0:1). In this case, strong externalities still lead to a short-term drop in GDP, and the brunt falls on the traded sector. But the low e¢ ciency of public investment accentuates these negative e¤ects, including the decline in private investment. In addition, over the medium term, the low e¢ ciency of public investment precludes crowding in e¤ects on private capital accumulation. Aid is harmful in this context, at least for growth.
C.3. Partial Absorption Policies
We now explore the macroeconomic implications of accumulating some of the additional aid ‡ows in reserves, a partial absorption policy, in the context of strong LBD externalities and low e¢ ciency of public investment. 36 This policy implies a trade-o¤. On the one hand, as Figure 7 shows, it does indeed succeed in diminishing some of the short-term appreciation pressures. On the other, it crowds out private investment (and consumption), as we saw in the baseline scenario. When e¢ ciency is low and the externalities strong, however, the costs in terms of lower private investment are low and medium-term real GDP e¤ects benign. The reason lies in the interaction of low e¢ ciency and strong externalities. When e¢ ciency is low, there is less public capital accumulation and thus less crowdingin. Indeed, the partial absorption policy encourages private investment insofar as it reduces mitigates the real appreciation and related negative e¤ect on productivity growth. These two e¤ects on private investment roughly counterbalance, as Figure 7 also shows.
These results lend some support to the notion that partial absorption policies may be an appropriate response to aid surges. It is important to underscore, though, that both the low e¢ ciency and the strong externalities are important here. This is con…rmed by the results presented in Figure 8 , which shows the simulations for both partial and full absorption policies, in the context of strong externalities and fully e¢ cient public investment (" A = 1). In this case, the GDP e¤ect of scaled-up aid is always positive, and more so over time in the presence of full absorption. After …ve years, GDP exceeds that under partial absorption and maintains this trend in the longer term. An important part of the transmission mechanism is a large increase in private capital accumulation due to the TFP gains that are multiplied by strong externalities (the "Dutch Vigor" e¤ect). In fact, traded-sector output overshoots its trend over the medium term, while the real exchange rate displays a persistent appreciation, in line with the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect. 37
V. Discussion
A theme running through the paper is that e¤orts to suppress the real exchange rate appreciation pressures associated with aid surges may be misguided. The baseline simulation showed that the resulting real appreciation is a critical element of the transmission mechanism that shifts resources from the traded to the non-traded sector, thereby enabling a supply response to the government's increased demand for nontradables and reducing the traded sector output. More importantly our experiments show that partial absorption policies designed to choke o¤ the real exchange rate appreciation in the short term can crowd out private consumption and investment, and have adverse real GDP e¤ects over the medium term.
The question remains, why do policy-makers continue to consider such e¤orts? One answer is that, contrary to our baseline calibration, the relative e¢ ciency of public investment, or the share of spending allocated to public investment, is low, while LBD externalities are strong. As explored above, fully spending and absorbing aid may be harmful in this context. However, even with strong externalities and low e¢ ciency, it is possible to do better than partial absorption policies-avoid the crowding out of the private sector-by combining them with partial spending policies. Figure 9 illustrates this, when only half of the aid in ‡ows are initially spent by the government ( = 0:5), and when half of the ‡ows are accumulated as reserves by the central bank (! = 0:5). In this case, appreciation pressures can be diminished, ameliorating the short-term crowding out e¤ect on private consumption and investment of fully spending and partially absorbing the aid. In practice, partial spending may face donor objections, given that they expect their scarce budgetary resources to be used for development and not to be saved by the recipient government. This adds the need for donor coordination to the policy mix. In principle, donors could scale up their aid at a pace that takes macroeconomic concerns into account or allow the government to smooth aid-…nanced expenditures over time by saving initially part of the ‡ows. 38
A welfare analysis con…rms that partial absorption policies may indeed induce welfare gains relative to full absorption policies, in the context of low e¢ ciency and strong externalities. To see this, we calculate the welfare gains of di¤erent reserve accumulation policies (aid absorption policies). We de…ne the welfare gain as the di¤ erence between the government life-time utility function U g o and its steady-state value. In turn, U g o is de…ned as the weighted average of the life-time utility functions of the two types of households. 39 Speci…cally,
for the asset holders (j = a) and hand-to-mouth consumers (j = h). Figure 10 presents the results of this welfare analysis. Consider …rst the left-hand side, which 3 8 Figure 9 that represents a scenario of limiting initial spending of aid is an example of such expenditure smoothing, because the …scal spending rule in equation (21) ensures that all aid is eventually fully spent.
3 9 Note that since our model is non-stochastic, the spirit of our analysis di¤ers from that of the recent optimal policy analysis of the New-Keynesian literature. This literature studies the optimal …scal and monetary policies in the context of stochastic models in which the volatility of the shocks plays a crucial role (see for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007, among others). Here we abtract from these issues.
shows the welfare gains for di¤erent reserve accumulation policies (aid absorption) as measured by the parameter ! in equation (23), assuming e¢ ciency is low. The solid line shows the results for the baseline case of full spending. Welfare gains are maximized for ! 0:25 implying a quite signi…cant reserve accumulation and, therefore, a partial absorption policy. Note also that with low e¢ ciency, a better approach would be to partially spend the aid ( = 0:5) as well. As the line with dots shows, this raises welfare relative to the full-spending case. 40 But the same welfare analysis also reveals that a better approach than implementing partial absorption policies might be to redirect e¤orts to quickly increase the e¢ ciency of public investment to enjoy the bene…ts of aid surges. 41 The right-hand side of Figure 10 con…rms the existence of very large gains of fully absorbing the aid (! = 1); relative to not absorbing it (! = 0), when externalities are strong and public investment is highly e¢ cient. In fact, it can be shown that these gains increase with the e¢ ciency of public investment. The same …gure shows that, in this case, partially spending the aid is a mistake from a welfare perspective, contrary to the low-e¢ ciency case.
Our previous analysis does not capture other concerns that may explain partial absorption policies. For instance concerns that may be related to volatility in relative prices, which is particularly relevant if a surge in aid is perceived to be temporary or of uncertain duration. If a temporary spike in aid is fully spent and absorbed, resources have to be shifted from the non-traded to the traded sector and then back again as the aid in ‡ows recede. This process introduces considerable volatility into the economy, including large swings in the real exchange rate and other relative prices. This is likely to be a costly process involving considerable turmoil in the traded and non-traded sector, as companies in both sectors are bu¤eted by large swings in prices and contract or expand rapidly. Ideally, these costs would be avoided by reducing the volatility of aid in ‡ows, but this is mostly a task for donors; aid-recipient countries could address aid volatility on the …scal side through expenditure smoothing accompanied by central bank foreign exchange sales that are limited to the amount of aid spent, in line with the discussion above.
Furthermore, countries may simply wish to accumulate international reserves, for reasons outside we have not modeled, such as a need for bu¤ers against capital account shocks. The lesson of this paper is that, while this may of course be a valid goal, policymakers need to carefully consider the interactions of discretionary policies by the government and the central bank in this context. An e¤ort to accumulate international reserves without a corresponding tightening of …scal policy is like spending but not absorbing aid. In particular, it calls for an increase in private savings to …nance the reserve accumulation and may thus require crowding out of private sector investment and consumption.
Finally, it is important to mention that besides the e¢ ciency of public investment and the intensity of LBD externalities, there are other features of the model that matter for the implications of partial absorption policies. These features include the share of hand-to-mouth consumers, the access to 4 0 The optimal degree of spending in general may also depend on the degree of absorption. A full welfare analysis of alternative optimal and implementable reserve accumulation and …scal spending rules in response to unpredictable and volatile aid shocks is outside the scope of this paper and is addressed in Portillo and Zanna (2010) . 4 1 In fact, public management capacity constraints in themselves may call for further investments in capacity, i.e. "to invest in investing" in the words of Collier (2007) . It has been notoriously di¢ cult for aid donors to improve public management, however, as discussed for example in Berg (1993) .
international capital markets, and the mobility of productive factors across sectors. The presence of hand-to-mouth consumers can give …scal policy and aggregate demand larger real e¤ects, including appreciation e¤ects, in the short run; the degree of access to international capital markets controls the e¤ectiveness of sterilized interventions; and the degree of factor mobility a¤ects the degree of real exchange rate appreciation. We refer the interested reader to Berg et al. (2010) that discuss in detail the role of all these features in a short-run analysis of policy responses to aid shocks.
VI. Conclusions
Our approach in this paper-and in our contribution to the broader "Gleneagles aid scaling-up scenarios" project-is to build and calibrate a dynamic micro-founded structural economic model to construct scenarios that can help us understand the short-and medium-term issues associated with large aid surges. Our model captures at best only crudely most of what is most important about aid. Purely real CGE models such as the World Bank's MAMS (Maquette for MDG Simulations) address a much richer set of sectoral issues. 42 Our purpose here is to capture the key microeconomic issues e¢ ciently in a way that informs a macroeconomic analysis, such as that required in the context of IMF-supported programs. We believe there has been underinvestment in this sort of analysis and view it as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, other approaches.
We also see our contribution as complementary to the empirical work that has examined the issues we study here, such as Arslanalp et al. (2010) . From the perspective of a policy maker or IMF country team conducting an analysis for a particular country, such empirical results are helpful background but can only be useful if understood in a structural sense, that is, in terms of fully articulated causal channels. The outcome of an aid surge depends on a number of country-speci…c factors, such as the macroeconomic policy response, the uses to which the aid is put, the e¢ ciency of public investment, and various parameters of the economy. This, in fact, has been one of the overarching lessons of the macroeconomic assessments in the "Gleneagles aid scaling-up scenarios" project.
The model we present here-like any such model-is incomplete and indeed incorrect in many ways. We do not expect that on its own it will produce good forecasts. But we believe that it can help organize thinking; provide a way to systematically incorporate various sorts of empirical evidence; and provide a vehicle for transparently producing alternative scenarios and comparing results across countries. In this regard, the calibration here is only a …rst step, and the quantitative properties of the model need to be more systematically compared to evidence. In particular, the application of variants of the model to historical episodes should help provide more reliable calibrations.
Nonetheless, a few critical themes emerge that we believe transcend a particular calibration. These include:
It is the e¢ ciency of aid-related public investment relative to steady-state investment e¢ ciency that determines the growth impact of aid-…nance public investment; rather surprisingly, changing assumptions about both steady-state and aid-surge-related e¢ ciency has o¤setting e¤ects.
The LBD externality raises the stakes for aid e¢ ciency: if aid is invested well, the interaction of both can produce even greater gains-producing Dutch vigor. If it is not, aid can be harmful for growth.
Partial absorption policies such as accumulating aid in reserves while spending the local counterpart can succeed in narrow terms in resisting appreciation, but at a cost to private investment and medium-term growth.
As a speci…c example of partial absorption, resisting "in ‡ation" in a …xed exchange rate regime may be a bad idea, if the in ‡ation is part of the relative price adjustment required to absorb aid.
When e¢ ciency is low and externalities strong, and thus aid is bad for growth, partial absorption policies may be better than full absorption, but even better would be partial spending. E¤orts to increase e¢ ciency would have potentially the greatest impact.
Much work remains to be done. Optimal …scal spending and reserve accumulation reactions to aid shocks and volatility, including the appropriate degree of smoothing, deserve more work. The experiments studied here demonstrate that the mixture of these responses interact with all the features of the model to drive growth as well as private consumption and hence welfare. Portillo and Zanna (2010) considers a range of assumptions about these factors looking for simple and implementable …scal spending and reserve accumulation rules that maximize welfare in the context of unpredictable and volatile aid shocks. We also defer to future work the question of endogenizing other policies responses, or for that matter those of aid donors, believing that such analyses would bene…t from a clear understanding of the underlying economics.
A number of model design issues and assumptions could be investigated to move forward from here. A semi-closed capital account is key to many of our results. Human capital would seem worth incorporating, at least for longer-term analyses. Public capital could be made sector-speci…c to permit the analysis of another policy option in the face of Dutch disease concerns: directing public investment towards the traded sector would presumably promote that sector's expansion, even as Balassa-Samuelson e¤ects cause a real appreciation.
Variations of the model could shed light on a number of important shocks. Natural resource booms and terms of trade shocks in resource-rich countries have many similar features to the aid shocks examined here. 43 For example, the management of resource booms involve similar decisions regarding spending and absorbing the capital in ‡ows associated with these booms. Similarly, the model could be extended to investigate debt-…nanced public investment shocks and their implications for debt sustainability. The IMF and the World Bank conduct debt sustainability analysis roughly every year for each low-income country. In principle, the framework of this paper could provide economic structure to these assessments and facilitate scenario analysis and stochastic simulations. We are currently working on such an extension. PtTt ; becomes evident.
The production function of the representative monopolist in the non-traded sector
can be also transformed into stationary terms by dividing both sides by T t : Then which can be written as
which is equivalent to equation (11).
B. In a symmetric equilibrium (dropping the sub-indices), the …rst order conditions of the representative monopolist in the non-traded sector are equations (10)- (12) On the other hand, in a symmetric equilibrium (dropping the sub-indices), the optimizing conditions for the …rm in the traded sector correspond to (13), (14), and l C. The E¢ ciency of Public Investment and GDP In this part of the Appendix, we prove that the percentage increase in GDP that results from a percentage increase in government spending depends on the ratio of the e¢ ciency of the aid-surge …nanced public investment and the e¢ ciency of the steady-state public investment. To do this, it is su¢ cient to simplify the model to one sector and consider the production function
and the public capital accumulation equation
Linearizing these equations around the steady state yieldŝ 
Using (54), (55), and (56) we obtain @ŷ t @ĝ t 1 = (1 )(1 ) (n+ g 1) n
which underscores the role of the relative e¢ ciency
It should be noted that this result depends on the Cobb-Douglas production function assumption. By assuming a CES production function
h (k t 1 ) (q t 1 )
we would obtain @ŷ t @ĝ t 1 = (1 )(1 )z (n+ g 1) 1 (1 ) n 
